# An axiomatisation of two dimensional irreflexive Minkowski Spacetime $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ 

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#### Abstract

We define temporal axioms that are sound and complete for the temporal validities over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$.


Introduction The topic should need little motivation. If we consider events taking place at spacetime points, in the real world, we find that communications between them form a non-linear order, where one spacetime point might be neither in the accessible future nor past of another spacetime point, since there is a maximum speed for all signals. Here we assume that the set of all spacetime points forms a Euclidean metric space with one temporal dimension and some spatial dimensions, and that signals may travel at up to the speed of light. If we measure distances in light-seconds, the speed of light is one. Our problem is to find temporal axioms that are sound and complete over Kripke frames $\left(\mathbb{R}^{n},<\right)$, where $<$ is defined by

$$
(\bar{x}, t)<\left(\overline{x^{\prime}}, t^{\prime}\right) \Longleftrightarrow\left(t<t^{\prime} \wedge\left|\overline{x^{\prime}}-\bar{x}\right| \leq t^{\prime}-t\right)
$$

It turns out that the temporal logic of such frames depends on the number $n-1$ of spatial dimensions, indeed it is known that there are modal formulas valid over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ but not over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{3},<\right)$, for example axiom $\square$ below. One critical difference between $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ and higher dimensional frames is that $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}, \leq\right)$ forms a complete distributive lattice, whereas in higher dimensions two spatially displaced spacetime points do not have a supremum (the upper bounds are bound below not by a point but by a hyperbola in $\left(\mathbb{R}^{3},<\right)$ ), nor do they have an infimum.

The modal logic of the reflexive closure $\leq$ of $<$ over $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ was shown to be S4.2 Gol80 and the modal logic of the slower than light irreflexive frame $\left(\mathbb{R}^{n}, \prec\right)$ is OI. 2 SS03] for any $n \geq 2$, however axioms for the temporal logic of any of these frames is not known.

Here we focus on the propositional temporal logic of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ where there is only one space dimension. Temporal formulas are built from propositions using connectives $\neg, \vee$ and $\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{P}$ (sometime in the future, sometime in the past) and standard abbreviations $\wedge, \rightarrow$ and $\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{H}$ (always in the future, always in the
past), formulas are evaluated in the normal way. Throughout this paper, a finite set of propositions Props will be known, and all temporal formulas will involve only propositions from Props.

We provide sound and complete axioms for the temporal validities over this frame, see theorems 6 and 9 below. It is known that the temporal validities of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ are decidable, a PSPACE algorithm was provided in HR18, theorem 5.2], but axioms were not given, indeed HR18, Problem (1)] asks for sound and complete temporal axioms over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}, \leq\right)$ and sound and complete axioms over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$.

First we recall a sound and complete set of axioms for $(\mathbb{R},<)$ (see [BG85). The proof rules are modus ponens, generalisation, $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash \mathbf{G} \phi, \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \mathbf{H} \phi$, and substitution (letters $p, q, r$ may be replaced by arbitrary temporal formulas).

1. $K$, axioms for propositional logic plus $\mathbf{G}(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(\mathbf{G} p \rightarrow \mathbf{G} q)$
2. Temporal $p \rightarrow \mathbf{G P} p$ and $p \rightarrow \mathbf{H F} p$
3. Serial, transitive, dense $\mathbf{F}\rceil \wedge \mathbf{P} \top, \mathbf{G} p \leftrightarrow \mathbf{G G} p$
4. Weak linear

$$
\operatorname{Lin}(q, r)=\left(\begin{array}{c}
(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} r) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}((q \wedge \mathbf{F} r) \vee(q \wedge r) \vee(r \wedge \mathbf{F} q)) \\
\wedge \\
(\mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{P} r) \rightarrow \mathbf{P}((q \wedge \mathbf{P} r) \vee(q \wedge r) \vee(r \wedge \mathbf{P} q))
\end{array}\right)
$$

5. Dedekind complete

$$
\operatorname{Ddk}(q)=\left(\begin{array}{cc}
(\mathbf{F} \neg q \wedge \mathbf{F G} q) & \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{G} q \wedge \mathbf{H F} \neg q) \\
& \wedge \\
(\mathbf{P} \neg q \wedge \mathbf{P} \mathbf{H} q) & \rightarrow \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{H} q \wedge \mathbf{G} \mathbf{P} \neg q)
\end{array}\right)
$$

Write $\vdash \psi$ if the temporal formula $\psi$ can be proved using rules and axioms above.

It is easy to check the soundness of these axioms over $(\mathbb{R},<)$. Completeness is proved by filtration and we outline the method as a guide to the proof of theorem 9 below. Recommended textbooks for the basic material (and much more) include BRV01, GHR94, vB83, in particular see BRV01, definition 2.16, theorem 2.20] for the next definition and proposition.

DEFINITION 1 A binary relation $R \subseteq X \times Y$ is a bisimulation between $(X,<)$ and $\left(Y,<^{\prime}\right)$ if

- $\left(\left(x_{1}<x_{2}\right) \wedge\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \in R\right) \Rightarrow \exists y_{2}\left(y_{1}<^{\prime} y_{2}, \wedge\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \in R\right)$
- $\left(\left(y_{1}<^{\prime} y_{2}\right) \wedge\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \in R\right) \Rightarrow \exists x_{2}\left(x_{1}<x_{2} \wedge\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \in R\right)$.

If a bisimulation happens to be a function : $X \rightarrow Y$ we may call it a p-morphism.
So a $p$-morphism $f:(X,<) \rightarrow\left(Y,<^{\prime}\right)$ is an order-preserving function such that

- If $f\left(x_{1}\right)<^{\prime} y_{2}$ then $\exists x_{2}\left(x_{1}<x_{2} \wedge f\left(x_{2}\right)=y_{2}\right)$,
- If $y_{1}<^{\prime} f\left(x_{2}\right)$ then $\exists x_{1}\left(x_{1}<x_{2} \wedge f\left(x_{1}\right)=y_{1}\right)$.

PROPOSITION 2 Let $R \subseteq X \times Y$ be a bisimulation between $(X,<)$ and $\left(Y,<^{\prime}\right)$. Let $v:$ Props $\rightarrow \wp(X), v^{\prime}:$ Props $\rightarrow \wp(Y)$ be propositional valuations such that whenever $(x, y) \in R$ and $p \in$ Props, we have $x \in v(p) \Longleftrightarrow y \in v^{\prime}(p)$. For all temporal formulas $\psi$, all $(x, y) \in R$

$$
(X,<), x \models_{v} \psi \Longleftrightarrow\left(Y,<^{\prime}\right), y \models_{v^{\prime}} \psi .
$$

The following definition is equivalent to [BRV01, definition 4.34], but here restricted to the finite language $C l(\phi)$.

DEFINITION 3 . Let $C l(\phi)$ be the set of subformulas and negated subformulas of $\phi$, let $M$ be the set of maximal consistent subsets of $C l(\phi)$, define an order $<$ over $M$ by

$$
\begin{equation*}
(m<n) \Longleftrightarrow \bigwedge_{p \in C l(\phi)}(p \in m \rightarrow \mathbf{P} p \in n) . \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

or equivalently, by the temporal axiom, $p \in n \rightarrow \mathbf{F} p \in m$. The directed graph $\mathcal{M}=(M,<)$ is called the canonical frame. The map $c:$ Props $\rightarrow \wp(M)$ defined by $c(p)=\{m \in \mathcal{M}: p \in m\}$ is called the canonical valuation.

Below, we allow letters $p, q$ to range over closure formulas. For each $p \in$ $C l(\phi), m \in \mathcal{M}$ we have $p \in m \Longleftrightarrow\left(\mathcal{M}, m \models_{c} p\right)$ (see BRV01, lemma 4.21]) but note that arbitrary temporal formulas may be evaluated at $(\mathcal{M}, m)$ with canonical valuation $c$, moreover

$$
\begin{equation*}
(\mathcal{M}, m) \models_{c} \psi \Longleftrightarrow m \vdash \psi . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

A proof of completeness of the axioms above for the logic of $(\mathbb{R},<)$ was given in Bur84, section 2.7].

An MCS $m \in M$ is irreflexive if there is $p \in C l(\phi)$ where $\{\mathbf{G} p, \neg p\} \subseteq m$, else it is reflexive (for all $p \in C l(\phi), \mathbf{G} p \in m$ implies $p \in m)$. Define an equivalence relation $\equiv$ over $M$ by, $m \equiv n \Longleftrightarrow((m<n \wedge n<m) \vee(m=n))$. Write $[m]$ for the $\equiv$-equivalence class of $m \in M$. For reflexive $m \in M$, the equivalence class $[m]=\{n \in M: m \equiv n\}$ is called the cluster of $m$, we write Clusters for the set of all clusters of reflexive MCSs. Write $I$ for the set of singleton irreflexive MCSs, but may treat such singleton as its irreflexive member. So Clusters $\cup I$ is the set of all equivalence classes of $M$. If $m \equiv m^{\prime}$ then $\mathbf{F} p \in m \Longleftrightarrow \mathbf{F} p \in m^{\prime}, \mathbf{P} p \in$ $m \Longleftrightarrow \mathbf{P} p \in m^{\prime}$. We may write $m \leq m^{\prime}$ for $m<m^{\prime} \vee m=m^{\prime}$. Since equivalent MCSs agree on all temporally bound formulas, (Clusters $\cup I,<$ ) also inherits a well-defined order, transitive and dense by axiom (3) (although finite), reflexive over Clusters and irreflexive over $I$, and antisymmetric. We write $\mathbf{M}=($ Clusters $\cup I,<)$ for the quotient $\mathcal{M} / \equiv$, distinguished from $\mathcal{M}$ by a change of font.

For $x, y \in$ Clusters $\cup I$ we write $\operatorname{Suc}(x, y)$ when $x<y$ and there is no $z \in($ Clusters $\cup I) \backslash\{x, y\}$ where $x<z<y$. For $x \in$ Clusters $\cup I$, let Successors $(x)=\{y \in$ Clusters $\cup I: \operatorname{Suc}(x, y)\}$, the set of immediate successors of $x$. By density, an irreflexive is never the successor of an irreflexive. We write $m \not \models_{c} n$ as a shorthand for $m \models_{c} \bigwedge n$ where $m, n \in \mathcal{M}$ (so this holds iff $m=n$ ), and we write $m \models_{c} d$ for $m \models_{c} \bigvee_{n \in d} n$ where $d$ is a cluster.

PROPOSITION 4 Axioms (11) (5) are complete over $(\mathbb{R},<)$.

## PROOF:

Given a consistent temporal formula $\phi$ we are required to find a propositional valuation $v$ : Props $\rightarrow \wp(\mathbb{R})$ such that $(\mathbb{R},<), x \models_{v} \phi$, for some $x \in \mathbb{R}$. It suffices to construct a $p$-morphism $f^{\prime}:(\mathbb{R},<) \rightarrow$ $\mathcal{M}$. The construction has two stages: first we define a $p$-morphism $f:(\mathbb{R},<) \rightarrow \mathbf{M}$; then we 'bulldoze' $f^{\prime}$ to obtain a $p$-morphism $f:(\mathbb{R},<) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$.

By the future weak linearity axiom (4), each element of Clusters $\cup$ $I$ has at most one successor and by the dual axiom it has at most one predecessor. Hence $\mathbf{M}$ is a spatial union of linear orders, i.e. there is no ordering between elements of distinct linear orders in $\mathbf{M}$. By density (3), one irreflexive is never the successor of another. By Dedekind completeness (5), one cluster is never the successor of another. Hence $\mathbf{M}$ is a disjoint union of traces, that is, linearly ordered alternating sequences of clusters and irreflexives. By seriality and its dual each trace starts and ends with a cluster.

Since $\phi$ is consistent, there is $m \in s \in \mathbf{M}$ (some $s$ ) where $\phi \in m$. Let $\tau=\left(c_{0}, m_{0}, c_{1}, m_{1}, \ldots, m_{k-1}, c_{k}\right)$ be a trace containing such an $s$.

Define $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbf{M}$ as follows.

$$
f(x)= \begin{cases}m_{i} & x=i \in \mathbb{N}, i \leq k-1 \\ c_{0} & x<0 \\ c_{k} & x>k-1 \\ c_{i+1} & i<x<i+1\end{cases}
$$

It is clear that $f$, so defined, is order-preserving. Also, if $a, b, \in$ Clusters $\cup I, S u c(a, b)$ and $f(x)=a$ then there is $y>x$ where $f(y)=b$, and similar for predecessors. Hence $f$ is a $p$-morphism from $(\mathbb{R},<)$ to $\mathbf{M}$. The range of $f$ is the trace $\tau$. But, since two equivalent MCSs need not agree on all propositions, there is no way of defining a valuation over $\mathbf{M}$ in a truth-preserving way.

To fix that, we bulldoze each cluster to get a $p$-morphism $f^{\prime}$ : $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$, as follows. Observe that $f^{-1}(c)$ is an open interval, including neither a maximal nor a minimal point, for each cluster $c$. By lemma 8 below, we can define $f^{\prime}: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ such that for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ we have $f^{\prime}(x) \in f(x)$, and whenever $f(x)=c$ and $m \in c$ there
are $y<x<y^{\prime}$ such that $f^{\prime}(y)=f^{\prime}\left(y^{\prime}\right)=m$. By this property, $f^{\prime}: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is a $p$-morphism.

Finally, define a propositional valuation $v$ : Props $\rightarrow \wp(\mathbb{R})$ by letting $v(p)=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}: p \in f^{\prime}(x)\right\}$. By proposition 2, since $f^{\prime}$ is a $p$-morphism, for all $p \in C l(\phi)$ and $x \in \mathbb{R}$, we have

$$
(\mathbb{R},<), x \models_{v} p \Longleftrightarrow p \in f^{\prime}(x)
$$

Hence there is $x \in \mathbb{R}$ where $(\mathbb{R},<), x \models_{v} \phi$, as required.

Over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ the first few axioms remain sound, but the linearity axiom fails (since $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ is non-linear) and the Dedekind completeness axiom also fails [for a counter-model, let $l \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ be any lightline and let $v(q)$ be the set of all points strictly above $l$, then $\mathbf{G} q$ holds strictly above $l$ but not elsewhere, the premise $\mathbf{F} \neg q \wedge \mathbf{F G} q$ holds at all points on or below $l$, but $(\mathbf{G} q \wedge \mathbf{H F} \neg q)$ holds nowhere, so the consequent fails.] To axiomatise the temporal logic of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ we must drop the linearity and Dedekind completeness axioms (3), (4) and replace them by weaker axioms (see axioms (IX), (XII)- (XIV) below). The transitivity axiom is included (since it remains valid) but is strengthened to axiom (V).

Notation and Definitions For convenience, we may adopt a change of bases, so axes are lightlines and

$$
(x, y)<\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right) \Longleftrightarrow\left(x \leq x^{\prime} \wedge y \leq y^{\prime} \wedge(x, y) \neq\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\right)\right)
$$

However, in the figures, lightlines are drawn at $45^{\circ}$, so time goes up the page and space goes across.

- For $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$ let $x \wedge y, x \vee y$ denote the infimum and supremum of $\{x, y\}$, let $x^{\uparrow}$, $x^{\downarrow}$ denote $\left\{y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}: x \leq y\right\},\left\{y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}: x \geq y\right\}$ respectively.
- An interval is a non-empty, convex set of reals. A product of intervals $I \times J$ is called a rectangle, which may be a point, a segment, or proper. A proper rectangle includes a corner iff it includes both bounding edge segments incident with the corner. The left and right corners of any rectangle are called spatial corners. A rectangle includes both spatial corners iff it includes all four corners. Two disjoint rectangles are neighbours if they share a spatial corner.
- For $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$ we write $x \sim y$ if $x \not \leq y$ and $y \not \leq x$.
- Let $v: \operatorname{prop} \rightarrow \wp\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}\right)$ be a propositional valuation. For a temporal formula $\phi$, write $v(\phi)$ for $\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}:\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right), x \models_{v} \phi\right\}$. We will freely interchange the equivalent statements $x \in v(p)$ and $x \models_{v} p$.
- Given temporal formulas $\phi, \psi$ we may define the relativization $\psi \upharpoonright \phi$ of $\psi$ to $\phi$

$$
\begin{aligned}
p \upharpoonright \phi & =p \wedge \phi & (\neg \psi) \upharpoonright \phi & =\phi \wedge \neg(\psi \upharpoonright \phi) \\
\left(\psi_{1} \vee \psi_{2}\right) \upharpoonright \phi & =\left(\psi_{1}\right) \upharpoonright \phi \vee\left(\psi_{2}\right) \upharpoonright \phi & & \\
(\mathbf{F} \psi) \upharpoonright \phi & =\phi \wedge \mathbf{F}(\psi \upharpoonright \phi) & & (\mathbf{P} \psi) \upharpoonright \phi=\phi \wedge \mathbf{P}(\psi \upharpoonright \phi)
\end{aligned}
$$

We will write down several temporal axioms then prove their soundness and completeness for the logic of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$. The axioms are a bit complicated, but they would look far worse without the introduction of some notational abbreviations, which we'll discuss shortly.

| Notation | Definition |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\square(p), \diamond(p)$ | $\mathbf{G H} p, \mathbf{F P} p$ |
| $\mathbf{F}^{0}(p), \mathbf{P}^{0}(p)$ | $p \vee \mathbf{F} p, p \vee \mathbf{P} p$ |
| $\uparrow(p, q), \downarrow(p, q)$ | $\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q), \mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} q)$ |
| $\# p$ | $\neg p \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p$ |
| $p \sim q$ | $\square(p \rightarrow \# q)$ |
| $\operatorname{Pt}(p)$ | $p \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg p \wedge \mathbf{G P} \# p \wedge \mathbf{H F} \# p$ |
| $\operatorname{After}(p, q)$ | $\square((p \rightarrow(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q)) \wedge(q \rightarrow \mathbf{P} p) \wedge((\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q) \rightarrow(p \vee q)))$ |

A set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ is spatial is $x \neq y \in S \Rightarrow x \sim y$. For $S, T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ we write $S \sim T$ when $\forall x \in S, t \in T(s \sim t)$. A set of (not necessarily spatial) sets $S_{i} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ for $i \in I$, is spatial if $i \neq j \in I \Rightarrow S_{i} \sim S_{j}$. A set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ is timelike if $s, t \in S \Rightarrow(s \leq t \vee t \leq s)$, a maximal timelike set is called a timeline, so all lightlines are timelines (but not conversely).

The axiom of 2-density $(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q)$ is not valid over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$, indeed it fails at a point where $\uparrow(p, q)$ holds, and this happens when $p$ and $q$ hold at points in the future at exactly the speed of light, but not in the same direction, and neither $p$ nor $q$ hold in the future at less than the speed of light, nor on the other lightline.

If $x \models_{v} P t(p)$ then $p$ holds at x but fails in the strict future and past of $x$, moreover there are points $y \sim x$ arbitrarily close to $x$ on both sides, such that $y \models_{v} \# p$. If $\models_{v} \operatorname{After}(p, q)$ then $v(p) \leq v(q)$ and no points are strictly between. The following equivalences follow from $K_{t}$

$$
\# p \equiv \neg(p \vee \mathbf{F} p \vee \mathbf{P} p) \quad \#(p \vee q) \equiv(\# p \wedge \# q) \quad \# p \equiv \# \# \# p
$$

and

$$
\square(p \rightarrow q) \Rightarrow \square(\# q \rightarrow \# p)
$$

Let $R \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$ be a rectangle. Then

$$
\begin{equation*}
v(p) \subseteq R \Rightarrow v(\# \# p) \subseteq R \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Rules and axioms For proof rules we use modus ponens, generalisation and substitution. Axioms for $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ :
I. $K$, axioms for propositional logic plus $\mathbf{G}(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(\mathbf{G} p \rightarrow \mathbf{G} q)$
II. Temporal $p \rightarrow \mathbf{G P} p$ and $p \rightarrow \mathbf{H F} p$
III. transitive, dense, serial $\mathbf{G} p \leftrightarrow \mathbf{G G} p, \mathbf{F} T$
IV. Between from below implies between from above

$$
\left(\left(p_{0} \sim p_{1} \sim p_{2} \sim p_{0}\right) \wedge \square\left(\left(\mathbf{F} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{2}\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{F} p_{1}\right)\right) \rightarrow \square\left(\left(\mathbf{P} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{P} p_{2}\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{P} p_{1}\right)
$$

V. '3-2' density

$$
\left(\bigwedge_{i<3} \mathbf{F} p_{i}\right) \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \neq k<3} \mathbf{F}\left(\mathbf{F} p_{j} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{k}\right)
$$

VI. Weak confluence

$$
(\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} r) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{P} r)) \upharpoonright(\# p)
$$

VII. Weak confluence and downward seriality

$$
((\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} r) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{P} r)) \wedge \mathbf{P} \top) \upharpoonright\left(\mathbf{P} \uparrow\left(p, p^{\prime}\right) \wedge \mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} p^{\prime}\right)
$$

VIII. Branching points are isolated.

$$
\uparrow(p, \# p) \rightarrow(\mathbf{G P} \# \uparrow(p, \# p) \wedge \mathbf{H F} \# \uparrow(p, \# p))
$$

IX. Branching points determine linear, Dedekind complete lightlines

$$
(\operatorname{Lin}(q, r) \wedge D d k(q)) \upharpoonright(\mathbf{P} \uparrow(p, \# p) \wedge \# p)
$$

X. Branching points determine grids

$$
\uparrow(p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p, q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q) \rightarrow \mathbf{F} \downarrow(p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p, q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q)
$$

XI. Closed cells include left and right corners

$$
[(\mathbf{H} \perp \wedge \uparrow(q, \# q) \wedge \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{G} \perp \wedge \downarrow(r, \# r))) \rightarrow(\mathbf{F}(\# q \wedge(\# r \vee \# \# r)) \wedge \mathbf{F}(\# \# q \wedge(\# \# r \vee \# r)))] \upharpoonright(\# p)
$$

XII. Densely shuffled rectangles (with at least three) are closed

$$
\left(\begin{array}{c}
(p \sim q) \wedge \mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q \\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}((\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q) \rightarrow \mathbf{F} \#(p \vee q)) \\
\\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}(\#(p \vee q) \rightarrow(\mathbf{F} p \leftrightarrow \mathbf{F} q))
\end{array}\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(\#(p \vee q) \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \#(p \vee q))
$$

XIII. Spatial Cauchy sequences converge

$$
\left(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p \wedge \mathbf{G}\left(\# p \rightarrow \mathbf{P}^{0}(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)\right)\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(P t(p) \vee P t(\# p))
$$

XIV. Neighbouring open rectangles cover common corner

$$
\left(\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p \\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}\left(\# p \rightarrow\left(\# \# p_{0}^{\prime} \wedge \# \# p_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}\left(\# \# p \rightarrow\left(\# \# p_{0} \wedge \# \# p_{1}\right)\right)
\end{array}\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}\left(\begin{array}{c}
\uparrow(p, \# p) \vee \downarrow(p, \# p) \\
\vee \\
\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{P} p_{i} \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{F} p_{i}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# p)\right. \\
\vee \\
\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{P} p_{i} \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{F} p_{i}\right)\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# p)
\end{array}\right)
$$

XV. Four adjacent rectangles cover corners

$$
\left(\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F}(\# p \wedge \mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} \# q) \\
\wedge \\
\neg(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} \# q \wedge \mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p) \\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}\left(\# p \rightarrow\left(\# \# p_{0}^{\prime} \wedge \# \# p_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
\wedge \\
\mathbf{G}\left(\# \# p \rightarrow\left(\# \# p_{0} \wedge \# \# p_{1}\right)\right)
\end{array}\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}\left(\begin{array}{c}
P t(p) \vee P t(\# p) \vee P t(q) \vee P t(\# q) \\
\vee \\
\uparrow(p, \# p) \vee \downarrow(p, \# p) \\
\vee \\
\left.\wedge \wedge_{i<2} \mathbf{F} p_{i}\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# p) \\
\wedge \\
{\left[\begin{array}{c}
\left(\mathbf{G} \bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{P} p_{i} \wedge \mathbf{H}\right. \\
\left(\mathbf{G} \bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{P} p_{i}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{H} \bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{F} p_{i}^{\prime}\right) \upharpoonright(\# p)
\end{array}\right]}
\end{array}\right)
$$

plus duals. We will prove the soundness of these axioms shortly, but first a preliminary lemma.

LEMMA 5 (Generalised Trichotomy) A consequence of $K_{t}$ plus transitivity is the validity of

$$
(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p) \vee(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p) \vee \# \# p \vee \# p
$$

and the four disjuncts are pairwise inconsistent.

## PROOF:

$(\# p \vee \neg \# p) \wedge(\# \# p \vee \neg \# \# p)$ is a propositional tautology, equivalent to

$$
\begin{equation*}
(\# p \wedge \# \# p) \vee(\# p \wedge \neg \# \# p) \vee(\neg \# p \wedge \# \# p) \vee(\neg \# p \wedge \neg \# \# p) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

The first three disjuncts of (4) are equivalent to $\perp, \# p, \# \# p$, respectively, using $\neg(p \wedge \# p)$ and $p \rightarrow \# \# p$. The last disjunct, $(\neg \# p) \wedge(\neg \# \# p)$, is equivalent to

$$
(p \vee \mathbf{F} p \vee \mathbf{P} p) \wedge(\# p \vee \mathbf{F} \# p \vee \mathbf{P} \# p)
$$

The term $(p \vee \mathbf{F} p \vee \mathbf{P} p) \wedge \# p$ is inconsistent, the term $p \wedge(\# p \vee$ $\mathbf{F} \# p \vee \mathbf{P} \# p)$ is also inconsistent, using $p \rightarrow \# \# p$. Terms $\mathbf{F} p \wedge$
$\mathbf{P} \# p, \mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p$ are inconsistent by propositional logic, transitivity and the definition of $\#$. So the last disjunct of (4) is equivalent to

$$
(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p) \vee(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p)
$$

and it follows that the tautology (4) is equivalent to $\# p \vee \# \# p \vee$ $(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p) \vee(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p)$, as required.

Inconsistency of any pair of disjuncts follows from $\neg(p \wedge \# p)$ and the definition of \#.

## Soundness

THEOREM 6 (Soundness) Axioms (I) - (XV), above, are valid over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$.

## PROOF:

Let $v:$ Prop $\rightarrow \wp\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}\right)$ be an arbitrary propositional valuation. For brevity, we write $x \models_{v} \psi$ instead of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right), x \models_{v} \psi$, and $\models_{v} \psi$ instead of $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right) \models_{v} \psi$. We check each axiom.
(II) -(III) These axioms are valid since $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ is transitive, dense, serial.
(IV) Assume the premises, and suppose also that $x \models_{v}\left(\mathbf{P} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{P} p_{2}\right)$ for some $x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$, we must show that $x \models_{v} \mathbf{P} p_{1}$. To prove this, since $x \models_{v} \mathbf{P} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{P} p_{2}$ there are $y_{0}, y_{1}<x$ where $y_{i} \models_{v} p_{i}$, and by a premise $y_{i} \sim y_{j}$ for $i \neq j<3$. Then $y_{0} \wedge y_{2} \models_{v} \mathbf{F} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{2}$, so $y_{0} \wedge y_{2} \models_{v} \mathbf{F} p_{1}$, by the other premise. Hence there is $z>$ $y_{0} \wedge y_{2}$ where $z \sim y_{0}, z \sim y_{2}$ and $z \models_{v} p_{1}$, it follows that $z$ is in the interior of the rectangle with corners $y_{0} \wedge y_{2}, y_{0}, y_{2}, y_{0} \vee y_{2}$, so $z<y_{0} \vee y_{2} \leq x$, proving $x \models_{v} \mathbf{P} p_{1}$, as required.
(V) Assume the premise holds at $x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$ under $v$, so there are $x_{i}>x$ where $x_{i} \in v\left(p_{i}\right)$, for $i<3$. There are just two future lightlines through $x$, so it is impossible that each of the three $x_{i}$ belong to different lightlines through $x$, so one of the lightlines $l$ includes neither $x_{j}$ nor $x_{k}$ for some $j \neq k<3$. It follows that $x_{j}$ and $x_{k}$ are above a point $y>x$ on the other lightline, strictly above $x$. So, $y \models_{v} \mathbf{F} p_{j} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{k}$, hence $x \models_{v} \mathbf{F}\left(\mathbf{F} p_{j} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{k}\right)$.
(VI) Note in passing that the unrestricted axiom, requiring weak confluence over the whole frame, is the special case where $p$ is falsity. Observe that

$$
\begin{aligned}
v(\# p) & =\bigcap_{x \in v(p)}\{y \in v(p): y \sim x\} \\
& =\bigcap_{x \in v(p)}(L(x) \cup R(x)) \\
& =\bigcup_{S \subseteq v(p)}\left(\bigcap_{x \in S} L(x) \cap \bigcap_{x \in v(p) \backslash S} R(x)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $L(x) \sim R(x)$ are the open rectangles strictly to the left or right of $x$ respectively, by infinite distribution. Hence $v(\# p)$ is a spatial union of rectangles. A maximal rectangle $R$ of $v(\# p)$ satisfies $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ and is not properly contained in any rectangle in $v(\# p)$. By Zorn's lemma, $v(\# p)$ is a spatial union of maximal rectangles. Suppose $x \models_{v}(\mathbf{F} q \wedge \mathbf{F} r) \upharpoonright(\# p)$. There must be $y, z>x \in v(\# p)$ in the same maximal rectangle as $x$, where $y \models_{v} q \upharpoonright(\# p)$ and $z \models_{v} r \upharpoonright(\# p)$. By rectangularity, the supremum $w$ of $y$ and $z$ is in the same rectangle, and $w \models_{v}$ $(\mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{P} r) \upharpoonright(\# p)$, so $x \models_{v} \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{P} q \wedge \mathbf{P} r) \upharpoonright(\# p)$, as required.
(VII) Similarly, observe that $v\left(\mathbf{P} \uparrow\left(p, p^{\prime}\right) \wedge \mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} p^{\prime}\right)$ is rectangular, hence weakly confluent, also it has no minimal element so $\mathbf{P} \top$ holds over the rectangle.

So $v(\# \# p)$ is also a spatial union of maximal rectangles. Before continuing with our soundness proof, we have a few comments about these rectangles.

The maximal rectangles in $v(\# \# p)$ may be computed from $v(p)$ in two steps: first extend $v(p)$ to $v(p \vee(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{P} p)) \subseteq v(\# \# p)$; secondly each connected subset $S \subseteq v(p \vee(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{P} p))$ generates a maximal rectangle $\{x \in v(\# \# p)$ : every timeline through $x$ meets $S\}$. Each maximal rectangle of $v(\# \# p)$ includes points in $v(p)$, by (3). A spatial corner $x$ of a maximal rectangle in $v(\# \# p)$ satisfies

$$
\begin{equation*}
x \models_{v} p \vee(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{G} p) \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Similarly $v(\# p)$ is a spatial union of rectangles, spatial with $v(\# \# p)$. Thus $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)=\bigcup_{\lambda \in \Lambda} R_{\lambda}$ for some index set $\Lambda$, where

- $R_{\lambda} \subseteq v(\# p)$ or $R_{\lambda} \subseteq v(\# \# p)$ is a maximal rectangle (for all $\lambda \in \Lambda)$,
- $R_{\lambda} \sim R_{\mu}($ for all $\lambda \neq \mu \in \Lambda)$,
- $v\left(\#\left(\bigcup_{\lambda \in \Lambda} R_{\lambda}\right)\right)=\emptyset$ and
- If rectangle $R \subseteq v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$ then either $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ or $R \subseteq v(\# \# p)$.

In view of the last point, a maximal rectangle in $v(\# p)$ is also maximal in $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$, and vice versa. Recall that two rectangles are neighbours if they share a spatial corner. So $R_{\lambda}$ neighbours $R_{\mu}$ iff $\lambda \neq \mu$ and there is no $\rho \in \Lambda$ where $R_{\rho}$ is spatially between $R_{\lambda}$ and $R_{\mu}$. Each rectangle may be open, partially open, or closed, and has up to four corners $\{t, b, l, r\}$, not necessarily distinct and not necessarily in the rectangle. If all corners are identical $R_{\lambda}$ is a point $\{t\}$, else if $b=l$ and $t=r$, or $b=r$ and $t=l$ we have a light segment (open, closed or semi), else all are distinct and we have a proper rectangle (open, closed or partial).

If $p \sim q$ and no maximal rectangle in $v(\# p)$ neighbours a maximal rectangle in $v(\# q)$ then

$$
\begin{equation*}
v(\# \#(p \vee q))=v(\# \# p) \cup v(\# \# q) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

If $\models_{v} \operatorname{After}(\# p, \# q)$ then for each maximal rectangle $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ there is a maximal rectangle $S \subseteq v(\# q)$ adjacent to $R$. Adjacent rectangles are disjoint but matching, there are three types of adjacencies: (i) two proper rectangles are adjacent if they share a common bounding edge segment, included in one rectangle but not the other, (ii) an edge segment is adjacent to a proper rectangle if the edge segment is a matching excluded boundary edge of the proper rectangle, or (iii) a singleton rectangle is adjacent to an edge segment if it is an excluded bound, of course these adjacencies may be reversed.

Apologies for the digression, we return to the proof of theorem6,
(VIII) Suppose $x \models_{v} \uparrow(p, \# p)$. From the definition of $\uparrow(p, \# p)$ we know that $x^{\uparrow} \cap v(\uparrow(p, \# p))=x^{\downarrow} \cap v(\uparrow(p, \# p))=\{x\}$. And there are $y, z>x$ on the two lightlines through $x$, where $y \models_{v}$ $p, z \models_{v} \# p$. Then $y^{\downarrow} \cap v(\uparrow(p, \# p))=z^{\downarrow} \cap v(\uparrow(p, \# p))=\emptyset$. $\mathrm{By}(3)$, the maximal rectangle $R(x) \subseteq v(\# \# \uparrow(p, \# p))$ is a single point $\{x\} \subseteq v(\# \# \uparrow(p, \# p))$. By maximality of $\{x\}$ there are points arbitrarily close to $x$ on both sides in $v(\# \uparrow$ $(p, \# p))$. Hence, $x \models_{v} \mathbf{G P} \# \uparrow(p, \# p) \wedge \mathbf{H F} \# \uparrow(p, \# p)$, as required.
(IX) Consider $v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{P} \uparrow(p, \# p))$, see figure 1. Let $x \in v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{P} \uparrow(p, \# p)) \subseteq v(\# p)$, let $R(x)$ be the maximal rectangle of $v(\# p)$ including $x$. There is $y<x$ where $y \models_{v} \uparrow(p, \# p)$. So $p$ holds at some point on one of the future halflightlines $l_{1}$ through $y$ and $\# p$ holds at some point on the other future halflightline $l_{2}$ through $y$, and neither $p$ nor $\# p$ holds in the slower than light future of $y$, nor on the other halflightline. Hence $v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{P} \uparrow(p, \# p)) \cap R(x)=$ $l_{2} \cap R(x)$, which is a linear and Dedekind complete ordered set, so the restricted axioms are true.
(X) Assume the premise holds at $x$, so $x \models_{v} \uparrow(p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p, q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q)$. There are $y, z$ on the two lightlines through $x$ where $y \models_{v}$ $p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p, z \models_{v} q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q$. Then $(y \vee z) \models_{v} \downarrow(p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg p, q \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg q)$, so the conclusion of the axiom holds at $x$.
(XI) The axiom is relativized to $\# p$. The premise $\mathbf{H} \perp$ can only hold at a minimal point of $v(\# p)$, at the (included) bottom corner of a maximal rectangle $R \subseteq v(\# p)$. The premise $\uparrow(q, \# q)$ implies that one lower edge of $\bar{R}$ is covered by $v(\# q)$ and the other is covered by $v(\# \# q)$. The premise $\mathbf{F}(\downarrow(r, \# r) \wedge \mathbf{G} \perp) \upharpoonright(\# p)$ implies that $\downarrow(r, \# r) \wedge \# p$ holds at the top corner of $R$, one upper edge is covered by $v(\# r)$ and the other is covered by


Figure 1: Axiom (IX). $v(\mathbf{P} \uparrow(p, \# p)) \cap v(\# p)$ is shown as a thick line, linear and Dedekind complete. [If there are any points in $v(p)$ where $p$ ? is indicated then max rectangle in $v(\# p)$ is bounded on the left, otherwise not.]


Figure 2: Points witnessing $p$ and points witnessing $\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p$ arbitrarily close to the right corner of $R\left(x_{0}\right) \subseteq v(\# p)$
$v(\# \# r)$. Either the left or the right corner of $R$ belongs to $v(\# p \wedge \# q \wedge(\# r \vee \# \# r))$, and the other corner belongs to $v(\# p \wedge \# \# q \wedge(\# \# r \vee \# r))$.
(XII) Assume the premise holds at $x$, so the three sets $v(p), v(q), v(\#(p \vee$ $q)$ ) are non-empty and dense within each other, i.e. spatially between any points in two distinct sets there is a point in the third set (all restricted to points above $x$ ).
Let $y>x, y \models_{v} \#(p \vee q)$ and let $R(y) \subseteq v(\#(p \vee q))$ be the maximal rectangle containing $y$. We claim that $R(y)$ includes its right corner $r$. To prove this, suppose instead that $r \notin R(y)$. By maximality of $R(y)$ we know $r \in v(\# \#(p \vee q))$. By the premise $\mathbf{G}((\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} q) \rightarrow \mathbf{F} \#(p \vee q))$, a maximal rectangle in $v(\# \# p)$ can never neighbour a maximal rectangle in $v(\# \# q)$, so by (6), $\quad r \in v(\# \# p)$ or $r \in v(\# \# q)$, without loss assume the former. Since $r$ is the included left corner of a maximal rectangle in $v(\# \# p)$, either $r \in v(p)$ or $r \in v(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{P} p)$. But then there are points $z<r$ below $R(y)$ on a lightline through $r$ where $z \models_{v} \mathbf{F}(\#(p \vee q)) \wedge \mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg q$, contradicting the premise. This proves the claim: $R(y)$ includes $r$, similarly it includes its left corner too, hence it contains its bottom corner $b$. So $b \in R(y)$ and the consequent to the axiom is witnessed at $b$.
(XIII) Assume the premise holds at $x$ and recall that $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$


Figure 3: The start of sequence $x_{0}, x_{1}, \ldots$ where no rectangle right of $R\left(x_{0}\right)$ includes any point on leftgoing lightline.
is covered spatially by maximal rectangles. We claim that there is a singleton maximal rectangle $\{y\} \subseteq v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$. We prove the claim shortly, but observe that at such a singleton $\{y\}$ we have $y \models_{v} \operatorname{Pt}(p) \vee \operatorname{Pt}(\# p)$, as required by the axiom.
For the claim, suppose for contradiction that none of the maximal rectangles in $(v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)) \cap x^{\uparrow}$ are points

$$
\begin{equation*}
x \models_{v} \mathbf{G} \neg(P t(p) \vee P t(\# p)) . \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

By the premise each maximal rectangle of $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ includes its bottom corner, but also at least one of its spatial corners $l, r$ is distinct from $b$. If $b \neq r$ we say that $R$ points right, if $b \neq l$ then we say that $R$ points left. Since $R$ is not a point, it points left or right but we should not assume it points both left and right, as proper rectangles do.
We define a spatial sequence $x_{0}, x_{1}, \ldots \subseteq v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)$ as follows. Let $x_{0} \in v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)$ be arbitrary. Let $R\left(x_{0}\right) \subseteq$ $v(\# p)$ be the maximal rectangle including $x_{0}$, with corners $x_{0}, t_{0}, l_{0}, r_{0}$. Without loss, suppose $R\left(x_{0}\right)$ points right. The whole sequence after $x_{0}$ will be to the right and within one of $r_{0}$ (if $R\left(x_{0}\right)$ does not point right, it points left, and the whole sequence is to the left of $l_{0}$ within one). There are points $z<y$ where $z \in v(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p)$, outside but arbitrarily close to $R\left(x_{0}\right)$, spatial with $x_{0}$, see figure 2 So by the premise, $\left.z \models_{v}(\mathbf{F}(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H}\urcorner \# p)\right)$. It follows that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall \delta>0 \exists w\left(w \models_{v}(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p),\left|w-r_{0}\right|<\delta\right) \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\left|w-r_{0}\right|$ denotes the Euclidean distance from $w$ to $r_{0}$.
If there is a point $w \models_{v} \# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p$ within one of $r_{0}$ such that the maximal rectangle $R(w) \subseteq v(\# p)$ is left pointing then let $x_{1}$ be such a point. The sequence continues $x_{2}, \ldots$ between $x_{0}$ and $x_{1}$ where $x_{2}$ is nearer the left corner $l_{1}$ of $R\left(x_{1}\right)$ than to $r_{0}$, as before. On the other hand, if for every $w \in v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)$ within one of $r_{0}$, the rectangle $R(w)$ is not left pointing, then let $x_{1}$ be any such $w$, so $R(w)$ is right pointing, illustrated in
figure 3. By (8) there is $w \in v(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)$ between $x_{0}$ and $x_{1}$, not necessarily nearer $l_{1}$ than $r_{0}$ and we let $x_{2}$ be any such point. By current assumptions, $R\left(x_{2}\right)$ is right pointing, so we may continue with $x_{3}$ between the right corner $r_{2}$ of $x_{2}$ and the left corner $l_{1}$ of $R\left(x_{1}\right)$, and nearer $r_{2}$ than $l_{1}$. We continue the sequence in this way so that $x_{i+2}$ is between $x_{i}$ and $x_{i+1}$, and the gap between $R\left(x_{i+2}\right)$ and $R\left(x_{i+3}\right)$ is at most half the gap between $R\left(x_{i}\right)$ and $R\left(x_{i+1}\right)$, for $i \geq 0$.
Clearly, this defines a spatial Cauchy sequence, let $x_{\infty}$ be the limit of the sequence. The sequence $x_{0}, x_{2}, x_{4}, \ldots$ converges to $x_{\infty}$ from one side and the sequence $x_{1}, x_{3}, \ldots$ converges to $x_{\infty}$ from the other side. Since $x_{\infty} \sim R\left(x_{i}\right)$ (all $i$ ) we have $x_{\infty} \in$ $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$ and the maximal rectangle of $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$ including $x_{\infty}$ is the singleton $\left\{x_{\infty}\right\} \subseteq v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$. This contradicts our assumption (7), proves the claim and, as noted above, this proves that the consequent to the axiom holds at $x$, as required.
(XIV) Assume the premises. Let $y$ be a point where the boundaries of $v(\mathbf{F} p)$ and $v(\mathbf{F} \# p)$ meet. By lemma 5 either $y \in v(\mathbf{F} p \wedge$ $\mathbf{F} \# p), y \in v(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p), y \in v(\# p)$ or $y \in v(\# \# p)$. In the first two cases we get $y \models_{v} \uparrow(p, \# p)$ and $y \models_{v} \downarrow(p, \# p)$, respectively. For the third case $y \models_{v} \# p$, consider $R(y) \subseteq$ $v(\# p)$ the maximal rectangle including $y$. Since the boundaries meet at $y$, it must be an included spatial corner of $R(y) \subseteq$ $v(\# p)$. By the premise $\mathbf{G}\left(\# p \rightarrow \# \# p_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ we have $y \in v\left(\# \# p_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, for $i<2$. By (5) it follows that $y \in v\left(p_{i}^{\prime}\right)$ or $y \in v\left(\mathbf{F} p_{i}^{\prime} \wedge\right.$ $\left.\mathbf{P} p_{i}^{\prime}\right)$. Either way, it follows that $y \models_{v}\left(\bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{G} \mathbf{P} p_{i}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{H F} p_{i}^{\prime}\right) \upharpoonright$ $R(y)$. Similarly, for the fourth case, $y \models_{v} \# \# p$ we get $y \models_{v}$ $\left(\mathbf{G} \bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{P} p_{i} \wedge \mathbf{H} \bigwedge_{i<2} \mathbf{F} p_{i}\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# p)$, so the axiom holds.
(XV) Assume the premise. Consider a maximal rectangle $R \subseteq$ $v(\# p)$. By the first premise, it is below a maximal rectangle $S$ (say) in $v(\# q)$ and by the second premise it is adjacent to $S$. Similarly, $R$ is adjacent below a maximal rectangle $T$ in $v(\# \# q), S$ is adjacent above a maximal rectangle $U \subseteq v(\# \# p)$ and $T$ is adjacent above a rectangle $V \subseteq v(\# \# p)$. All of that is to show that $R$ is bound on both sides and similarly, all the maximal rectangles in either $v(\# p), v(\# \# p), v(\# q)$ or $v(\# \# q)$ are bound on both sides, so all four corners of these rectangles exist. If a maximal rectangle in $v(\# p) \cup v(\# \# p)$ includes both its left and right corners, it must also include its bottom corner $b$, so either $b \models_{v}(\# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# p)$ or $b \models_{v}(\# \# p \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \# \# p)$. Either way, by axiom XIII, we conclude $P t(\# p) \vee P t(\# \# p)$, giving the first line of disjuncts in the consequent. Similarly, if a maximal rectangle in $v(\# q)$ or in $v(\# \# q)$ includes both its left and right corners, a disjunct in the first line of the consequent must hold.

So suppose all maximal rectangles omit either their left or right corner. Say $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ omits a corner $\gamma$, either left or right. By lemma $5 \gamma$ belongs to $v(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p), v(\mathbf{P} p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# p), v(\# p)$ or $v(\# \# p)$. If $\gamma \in v(\mathbf{P} \# p \wedge \mathbf{P} \# \# p)$ then $\gamma \models_{v} \downarrow(\# p, \# \# p)$, similarly $\gamma \in v(\mathbf{F} p \wedge \mathbf{F} \# p)$ implies $\gamma \models_{v} \uparrow(p, \# p)$, and a disjunct in the second line of the consequent holds. We can't have $\gamma \in v(\# p)$ since we are assuming that the maximal $R \subseteq v(\# p)$ omits $\gamma$. Hence $\gamma \in v(\# \# p)$ is a corner of a neighbouring rectangle $U \subseteq v(\# \# p)$. As in the previous case this implies that $\gamma \models_{v}\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{P} p_{1}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} p_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{1}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# p)$. But also, the neighbour $U \subseteq v(\# \# p)$ omits its other corner which must be the corner of a maximal rectangle of $v(\# p)$, where $\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} p_{0}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{P} p_{1}^{\prime}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} p_{0}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{F} p_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# p)$ holds. Hence, if the first two lines of disjuncts all fail then both conjuncts in the final disjunct must hold.

Completeness To prove completeness of the axioms we use a filtration method, along the lines of the proof of proposition 4. The terms and definitions of the proof of proposition 4 are unchanged in particular definitions 1, 3, equation (1): $C l(\phi), \mathcal{M},<, \equiv$ Clusters $, I, \models_{c}, \mathbf{M}, S u c$ etc. The only change is that the axioms used to define consistency have changed considerably. The task is to construct a $p$-morphism $f:\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$.

By density, its still the case that one irreflexive cannot succeed another, but without linearity a node can have more than one successor and more than one predecessor, and without Dedekind completeness, one cluster may succeed another. To partially make up for this, by weak confluence and finiteness, we know that $\mathbf{M}$ is a spatial union of interval frames $\mathbf{M}(u, v)=\{s \in$ Clusters $\cup I: u \leq s \leq t\}$, where $u \leq v \in \mathbf{M}$. By seriality, these interval frames have maximal and minimal clusters.

For $S, T \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ we write $S \sim T$ when for all $s \in S, t \in T$ we have $s \sim t$. For any $S \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ we write $\#(S)$ for $\{m \in \mathcal{M}: m \sim S\}$. We say that $S$ is spatial if $s \neq t \in S \rightarrow s \sim t$. Every singleton set is spatial. A set $\left\{S_{i}: i<k\right\}$ of (not necessarily spatial) subsets of $\mathcal{M}$ is spatial if $i \neq j<k \rightarrow S_{i} \sim S_{j}$. For temporal formula $p$ we write $\mathcal{M}(p)$ for the restriction of the frame to $\left\{f \in \mathcal{M}: f \models_{c} p\right\}$.

LEMMA 7 (Non-lattice) Suppose $\models_{c} S u c\left(s_{0}, t_{0}\right) \wedge S u c\left(s_{0}, t_{1}\right) \wedge S u c\left(s_{1}, t_{0}\right) \wedge$ $\operatorname{Suc}\left(s_{1}, t_{1}\right)$ and $s_{0} \sim s_{1}, t_{0} \sim t_{1}$, for some $s_{0}, s_{1}, t_{0}, t_{1} \in \mathbf{M}$. Also suppose that $s_{0}$ is irreflexive. Then $s_{1}, t_{0}, t_{1}$ are clusters and

$$
s_{0} \equiv \uparrow\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right), s_{1} \equiv\left(\mathbf{F} t_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} t_{1} \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg \uparrow\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)\right) \equiv \# s_{0}
$$

## PROOF:

Suppose $s_{0}$ is irreflexive. Since $s_{0}<t_{0}$, $t_{1}$ we have $s_{0} \models_{c} \mathbf{F} t_{0} \wedge$
$\mathbf{F} t_{1}$. Since $s_{0}$ is irreflexive, $s_{0} \models_{c} \mathbf{G} \neg s_{0}$, hence $s_{0} \models_{c} \mathbf{G} \neg\left(\mathbf{F} t_{0} \wedge\right.$
$\left.\mathbf{F} t_{1}\right)$, so $s_{0} \models_{c} \uparrow\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)$. Since they succeed an irreflexive and by density, $t_{0}, t_{1}$ are clusters. And $s_{1} \sim \uparrow\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right), s_{1}<t_{0}, t_{1}$ implies $s_{1} \models_{c} \# s_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} t_{0} \wedge \mathbf{F} t_{1}$. Finally, $s_{1}$ cannot be irreflexive, else $s_{1} \models_{c} \uparrow$ $\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right) \wedge \# \uparrow\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)$, an impossibility.

LEMMA 8 If $f:\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right) \rightarrow \mathbf{M}$ is a p-morphism where for each cluster $c$ the set $f^{-1}(c)$ has no maximal or minimal points, then there is a p-morphism $f^{\prime}:\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$.

PROOF:
Define $f^{\prime}$ over $f^{-1}(c)$ by mapping a countable sequences of arbitrarily high and low points to $m$ for each $m \in c$ (such sequences exist since the reals are Archimedean) and mapping all remaining points of $f^{-1}(c)$ to arbitrary MCSs in $c$, and repeat this for all clusters $c$. Let $f^{\prime}(m)=f(m)$ for irreflexives $m \in \mathcal{M}$. Then $f^{\prime}$ is easily seen to be a $p$-morphism.

For $f^{\prime}$ constructed as in the proof and $c \in$ Clusters, we may say that $f^{\prime}$ maps densely to cluster $c$.

A map $f: \mathbb{R}^{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ determines a propositional valuation $v_{f}$ over $\mathbb{R}^{2}$ by $v_{f}(p)=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}: p \in f(x)\right\}$. If $f:\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is a $p$-morphism then by proposition 2,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right), x \models_{v_{f}} \theta \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M}, f(x) \models_{c} \theta \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$ and all temporal formulas $\theta$.
THEOREM 9 Axioms (II) -(XV) are complete over $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$.

## PROOF:

We aim to show that there is a $p$-morphism from $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right)$ to $\mathcal{M}$. To get there, we prove for any $u \leq v \in \mathcal{M}$ that there is a $p$-morphism $f: R \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(u, v)$ for some rectangle $R \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{2}$. [Clearly, if $R, R^{\prime}$ are rectangles that include corresponding corners with the same equalities between them, then there is an invertible order preserving bijection $(R,<) \rightarrow\left(R^{\prime},<\right)$.] The rectangle $R$ constructed will include its top corner iff $v$ is irreflexive, and include its bottom corner iff $u$ is irreflexive. The proof is by induction on the size of $\mathbf{M}(u, v)$, i.e. the number of irreflexives and clusters of $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$. In the base case we have $u=v$, either a cluster or irreflexive. In the former case let $R$ be any proper rectangle excluding its top and bottom corners and map densely from $R$ to the MCSs in the single cluster, see lemma 8 In the latter case, let $R=\{x\}$ be a single point and map $x$ to the single irreflexive, to obtain a $p$-morphism. So suppose $u \neq v$.

Let $\operatorname{Fat}(u, v)=\left\{f \in \mathcal{M}(u, v): \mathcal{M}(u, v) \models_{c} \neg \# f\right\}$, so fat elements are ordered with everything in the frame, note that $u, v \in$ $F a t(u, v)$, and $F a t(u, v)$ is linearly ordered by $<$. For $f \in \mathcal{F}(u, v)$ we have $f \in \operatorname{Fat}(u, v) \Longleftrightarrow(\mathcal{F}(\# f) \cap \mathcal{F}(u, v)=\emptyset)$.

An irreflexive $m$ cannot have more than two successors, by axiom (V). If $m$ has two successors $c, d$ then $m \models_{c} \uparrow(c, d)$ and by axiom (VIII) it is not fat, similarly if $m$ has two predecessors it is not fat. Hence if $m \in F a t(u, v), u<m<v$ is irreflexive, it has a unique successor and a unique predecessor in $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$ and these are both fat, by uniqueness. If there is a cluster $c \in \operatorname{Fat}(u, v) \backslash\{u, v\}$, then $\mathcal{M}(u, c)$ and $\mathcal{M}(c, v)$ have $p$-morphisms, inductively. A $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$ may be obtained from a $p$-morphism $f: R \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(c, v)$ by picking $x \in f^{-1}(c)$, in the interior, and overwriting the interior of $R \cap x^{\downarrow}$ using a scaled copy of a $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(u, c)$. So now we assume no clusters of $\mathcal{M}(u, v) \backslash\{u, v\}$ are fat.

Suppose $u$ has an irreflexive successor $m$ and $v$ is a successor of $m$, so $u, v$ are both clusters by the density axiom. Consider $\mathcal{M}(\# m)$. If $m$ is fat then it is the only successor of $u, \mathcal{M}(u, v) \cap \mathcal{M}(\# m)=\emptyset$ and we define $f: \mathbb{R}^{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(u, v)$ by mapping all points on some extensive spatial line to $m$, points above the line map densely to $v$ and points below map densely to $u$. Now we can assume that $\mathcal{M}(u, v) \backslash\{u, v\}$ has no fat elements at all.

We also consider the case where $\models_{c} S u c(u, m) \wedge S u c(m, v)$ for some $m \in I$ but $m$ is not fat. By weak confluence (axiom VI), $\mathcal{M}(\# m)$ is a spatial union of interval frames $\mathcal{M}\left(\lambda^{b}, \lambda^{t}\right)$ where $\lambda^{b} \leq$ $\lambda^{t} \in \mathcal{M}(\# m)$ for $\lambda \in \Lambda$, some non-empty index set. For now, suppose $|\Lambda| \geq 2$. By axiom XIII (and dual), each $\lambda^{b}, \lambda^{t}$ is irreflexive. Define $f: R \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(u, v)$ by the following shuffle procedure (see [HR18, definition 3.3]). Initialise a queue with the single rectangle $R$, whose width is positive. Choose a maximal interval $\mathcal{M}\left(\lambda^{b}, \lambda^{t}\right) \subseteq$ $\mathcal{M}\left(\# m^{\prime}\right)$. If this interval is a point, $\lambda^{b}=\lambda^{t} \in I$, then let $f(x)=\lambda^{b}$, and enqueue the open quadrant spatially left of $x$ and the open quadrant spatially right of $x$, each rectangle is half the width of $R$. Otherwise, let $S$ be the closed rectangle with centre $x$, one third the size of $R$ in both dimensions. Use a $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}\left(\lambda^{b}, \lambda^{t}\right)$ to define $f$ over $S$. Enqueue the open quadrant spatially left of $S$ in $R$ and the open quadrant spatially right of $S$ in $R$, each of them is one third the width of $R$. Repeat this process countably often, using a fair schedule when picking rectangles from the queue and interval frames. Let $f$ be the map defined in the limit of this procedure. Extend $f$ to the whole of $R$ by mapping all undefined points below the rectangles densely to $u$, mapping all undefined points above the rectangles densely to $v$, and mapping all points in the Cantor set of points spatial to all the rectangles, to $m^{\prime}$. This defines a surjective $\operatorname{map} f: R \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(u, v)$.

It is clear that $f$, so defined, is order preserving, moreover as the rectangles are all closed and all rectangles and all $\lambda \in \Lambda$ are chosen, $f$ is a $p$-morphism.

To cover the case where $\Lambda=\{\lambda\}$ is a singleton, we slightly extend the shuffle procedure above to cover this case too. When choosing a
rectangle $S$ co-central with $R$ and one third the size, $S$ must include its supremum iff $\lambda^{t}$ is irreflexive, and include its infimum iff $\lambda^{b}$ is irreflexive. If $S$ omits its bottom corner $b$ then it also omits either the left corner $l$ and the edge $(b, l)$, or the corner $r$ and the edge $(b, r)$. Then we use a $p$-morphism to $\mathcal{M}\left(\lambda^{b}, \lambda^{t}\right)$ suitably scaled, over $S$. As before we repeat countably often, fill in remainder with $u$ below, $v$ above and $m^{\prime}$ between, but when checking the $p$-morphism condition, we must also consider a point $y$ where $f(y)=u$, on the lower boundary of some rectangle $S$ that omits its bottom corner $b$. Since $u \models_{c} \mathbf{F} m^{\prime}$ we need to find $z>y, f(z)=m^{\prime}$. If $S$ omits its left corner $l$ then $l$ will never be covered by a rectangle in the shuffle process, hence $f(l)=m^{\prime}$, we may take $z=l$ and we have $y \models_{c} \mathbf{F} m^{\prime}$. Similarly if $y \in(b, r)$ then $f(y) \models_{c} \mathbf{F} m^{\prime}$. If $y=b$ then $S$ omits $l$ (and $(b, l)$ ) or $r$ (and $(b, r)$ ), either way $f(y) \models \mathbf{F} m^{\prime}$, as before. Dually, predecessors of $v$ are witnessed, so $f$ is a $p$-morphism.

So we may now assume that in $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\models_{c} \neg \bigvee_{m \in I}(S u c(u, m) \wedge S u c(m, v)) \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

Consider Sucessors (u), the set of successors of $u$. Since $u<v$, $u$ has at least one successor. If Successors $(u)=\{v\}$ then an open $p$-morphism over $(0,2) \times(0,1)$ is easily obtained by mapping densely to $u$ over $(0,1] \times(0,1)$ and mapping densely to $v$ over $(1,2) \times(0,1)$, noting that the common boundary segment $\{1\} \times(0,1)$ is open in the second coordinate.

Since $u$ and $v$ are the only fat elements, we may now assume that $u$ has at least two successors. But $u$ cannot have three or more successors without contradicting (10). To see why, suppose $u$ has three or more successors, say Successors $(u)=\left\{s_{i}: i<k\right\}$, where $k \geq 3$ and $s_{i} \in$ Clusters $\cup I$. For each $i<k$ let $s_{i}^{+} \geq s_{i}$ be maximal in $\mathcal{M}\left(\# \# s_{i}\right)$, so $\mathcal{M}\left(\# \# s_{i}\right)=\mathcal{M}\left(s_{i}, s_{i}^{+}\right)$. Note that $\models_{c} S u c\left(u, s_{i}\right) \wedge$ $\operatorname{Suc}\left(s_{i}^{+}, v\right)$. By axiom (V), $u$ is a cluster. The premise of axiom (XII) holds with $s_{0}, s_{1}, \#\left(s_{0} \vee s_{1}\right)$ for $\#(p \vee q), p, q$, respectively. Hence there is an irreflexive MCS $m$ where $m \models_{c} s_{0} \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg s_{0}$. But then, by axiom XIII, there is an irreflexive $m^{\prime}$ where $m^{\prime} \models_{c} \operatorname{Pt}\left(s_{0}\right) \vee P t\left(\# s_{0}\right)$. If $m^{\prime} \models{ }_{c} P t\left(s_{0}\right)$ then $s_{0}=s_{0}^{+}$so $\models_{c} S u c\left(u, m^{\prime}\right) \wedge S u c\left(m^{\prime}, v\right)$, contrary to (10), but similarly if $m^{\prime} \models{ }_{c} \operatorname{Pt}\left(\# s_{0}\right)$ then there is $0<i<k$ where $m^{\prime} \models_{c}\left(P t\left(s_{i}\right)\right)$ and as before (10) is contradicted.

So the remaining case is where $u$ has exactly two successors. Here we break into subcases, according to whether $u$ is irreflexive or a cluster.

Suppose $u$ is irreflexive with two successors $c, c^{\prime}$. Rename $m_{00}=$ $u$. By axiom (IX), $\mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} m_{00} \wedge \# c^{\prime}\right)=\left(c_{0}, m_{10}, c_{1}, \ldots, c-1, m_{k-1,0}\right)$ or $\mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} m_{00} \wedge \# c^{\prime}\right)=\left(c_{0}, m_{10}, c_{1}, \ldots, c_{k-1}, m_{k-1,0}, c_{k}\right)$, for some $k \geq$ 1 , some some clusters $c_{i}$ and irreflexives $m_{i}$. Similarly $\mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} m_{00} \wedge\right.$


Figure 4: $\mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} \uparrow\left(c, c^{\prime}\right) \wedge \# c^{\prime}\right)=\left(c_{0}, m_{10}, c_{1}, m_{20}, c_{2}\right), \mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} \uparrow\left(c, c^{\prime}\right) \wedge \# c\right)=$ ( $c_{0}^{\prime}, m_{01}, c_{1}^{\prime}$ ). Single cluster on all segments.
$\# c)=\left(c_{0}^{\prime}, m_{01}, c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, m_{0, k^{\prime}-1}\right)$ or $\mathcal{M}\left(\mathbf{P} m_{00} \wedge \# c\right)=\left(c_{0}^{\prime}, m_{01}, c_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, m_{0, k^{\prime}-1}, c_{k^{\prime}}\right)$.
The former choice applies in each case when $v$ is irreflexive, and the latter when $v$ is a cluster. This is illustrated in figure 4 where $v$ is a cluster, $k=2, k^{\prime}=1$. For each irreflexive $m_{i, 0}$ in the first trace and $m_{0, j}$ in the second trace, there is an irreflexive $m_{i, j}$ where $m_{i, j} \models_{c} \downarrow\left(m_{i, 0}, m_{0, j}\right)$, by axiom (X). When $v$ is irreflexive we have $v=m_{k-1, k^{\prime}-1}$. For $i<k-1, j<k-1^{\prime}$ there is an interval frame $\mathcal{M}\left(m_{i, j}, m_{i+1, j+1}\right)$. If $v$ is a cluster then there is a top external interval frame $\mathcal{M}\left(m_{k-1, k^{\prime}-1}, v\right)$. Both traces end in clusters, $c_{k-1}, c_{k^{\prime}-1}^{\prime}$, there are also 'external' interval frames $\mathcal{M}\left(m_{k-1, j}, c_{k-1, j+1}\right)$ for $j<$ $k-1^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}\left(m_{j, k^{\prime}-1}, c_{j+1}^{\prime}\right)$ for $j<k-1$, shown in figure 4.

If $k>0$ of $k^{\prime}>0$, each interval frame has a $p$-morphism, inductively. A $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$ may be obtained from these $p$-morphisms by joining them together in a grid.

Otherwise, $k=k^{\prime}=0$. We are currently assuming that $u$ has two successors $c, c^{\prime}$ and $u$ is irreflexive, $v$ might or might not be. Then $u \models_{c} \uparrow\left(c, c^{\prime}\right)$. By axiom (VII), the weak confluent law and downward serial law $\mathbf{P} \top$ holds over the restriction to $\mathbf{P} \uparrow\left(c, c^{\prime}\right) \wedge \mathbf{P} c \wedge \mathbf{P} c^{\prime}$, so there is a single cluster $e$ successor to both $c$ and to $c^{\prime}$. Inductively, there is a $p$-morphism $f: R \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(e, v)$, where $R$ is open when $v$ is a cluster, includes top corner only when $v$ is irreflexive. Extend $f$ by including the lower boundary of $R$ in the domain, mapping the bottom corner to $u$, points on one open lightline segment through the bottom corner map densely to $c$, points on the other open lightline segment map densely to $c^{\prime}$, and in the case where $v \models_{c} \downarrow\left(d, d^{\prime}\right)$ is irreflexive extend to left and right corners of $R$ an MCS where $\# c \wedge\left(\# d \vee \# d^{\prime}\right)$ or $\left(\# c^{\prime} \wedge\left(\# d^{\prime} \vee \# d\right)\right.$ holds, respectively, such MCSs exist by axiom XI. This completes the case where $u$ is irreflexive and has two successors. The case where $v$ is irreflexive with two predecessors is similar.

So now suppose $u<v$ are clusters, Successors $(u)=\left\{a, a^{\prime}\right\}$ and $v$ has two predecessors $b \sim b^{\prime}$. Since there are only two successors, $\mathcal{M}(\# a)$ is weakly confluent and connected, hence actually confluent. Since $a \in \mathcal{M}(\# \# a)$ is a successor of $u$ we know that $a$ is the bottom element of $\mathcal{M}(\# \# a)$, let the top element be $a^{+}$, so $\mathcal{M}(\# \# a)=$ $\mathcal{M}\left(a, a^{+}\right)$, similarly $\mathcal{M}(\# a)=\mathcal{M}\left(a^{\prime}, a^{\prime+}\right)$ for some $a^{\prime+} \geq a^{\prime}$. Note that $\mathcal{M}(\# a)=\mathcal{M}\left(\#\left(a^{+}\right)\right), \mathcal{M}\left(\#\left(a^{\prime}\right)\right)=\mathcal{M}\left(\#\left(a^{\prime+}\right)\right)=\mathcal{M}(\# \# a)$.

In the first subcase we suppose $\models_{c} \operatorname{Suc}\left(a^{+}, v\right) \wedge \operatorname{Suc}\left(a^{\prime+}, v\right)$. There are essentially two ways this can happen, illustrated in figure 5. Suppose $a$ or $a^{\prime}$ is irreflexive, by axiom XIII we have $\models_{c}$ $P t(a) \vee P t(\# a)$ so there is an irreflexive successor $m$ of $u$ where $v$ is a successor of $m$ and $\operatorname{Pt}(m)$ holds. For this case, a $p$-morphism $f: \mathbb{R}^{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(u, v)$ is defined as follows, illustrated in the first part of figure 5. Let $f(0,0)=m$, let $f$ map $(0,0)^{\uparrow} \backslash\{(0,0)\}$ densely to $v$, map $(0,0)^{\downarrow} \backslash\{(0,0)\}$ densely to $u$, use an open $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(\# a)$ over the open quadrant $\{(x, y): x<0<y\}$, and another


Figure 5: $\mathcal{M}(\# a)=\mathcal{M}\left(a^{\prime}, a^{\prime+}\right), \mathcal{M}\left(\# a^{\prime}\right)=\mathcal{M}\left(a, a^{+}\right)$. Left, $\bullet \models_{v} \operatorname{Pt}(a)$.
Right, $\bullet \models_{v}\left(\mathbf{G P} a^{+} \wedge \mathbf{H F} a\right) \upharpoonright\left(\# a^{\prime}\right)$.
copy of the $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(\# a)$ over $\{(x, y): y<0<x\}$.
Otherwise, $a, a^{\prime}$ are both clusters and we may apply axiom XIV to obtain an MCS where $\uparrow(a, \# a) \vee \downarrow(a, \# a) \vee\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} a^{+} \wedge \mathbf{P} a^{\prime+}\right) \wedge\right.$ $\left.\mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} a \wedge \mathbf{F} a^{\prime}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# a) \vee\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} a^{+} \wedge \mathbf{P} a^{\prime+}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} a \wedge \mathbf{F} a^{\prime}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# a)$. The first disjunct contradicts our assumption $\operatorname{Suc}(u, a)$, the second contradicts $v=a \vee a^{\prime}$, so the third or fourth disjunct must hold. If the third disjunct $\models_{c} \mathbf{F}\left(\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} a^{+} \wedge \mathbf{P} a^{\prime+}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} a \wedge \mathbf{F} a^{\prime}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# a)$ construct an open $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$, illustrated in the right of figure 5, by mapping $\{(x, y): 0<x, 0 \leq y\}$ densely to $v$, mapping $\{(x, y): x \leq 0, y<0\}$ densely to $u$, using an open $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}(\# a)$ over $\{(x, y): y<0<x\}$ and using a semi-open $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}\left(\# a^{\prime}\right)$ over $\{(x, y): x \leq 0 \leq y\}$, so the positive $y$-axis map sensely to $\# a^{\prime+}$, the negative $x$-axis maps densely to $\left(\# a^{\prime}\right)$, and $f(0,0) \models_{c}\left(\mathbf{G P} a \wedge \mathbf{H F} a^{+}\right) \upharpoonright(\# \# a)$. The case where the fourth disjunct $\left.\mathbf{G}\left(\mathbf{P} a^{+} \wedge \mathbf{P} a^{\prime+}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H}\left(\mathbf{F} a \wedge \mathbf{F} a^{\prime}\right)\right) \upharpoonright(\# a)$ holds is similar.

That leaves the case where $\left\{\# a^{+}, \# a^{\prime+}\right\} \cap\left\{b, b^{\prime}\right\}=\emptyset$. Since only $u, v$ are fat, $(\# a)^{+}$has two successors $a_{1} \sim a_{1}^{\prime}$ and these are also successors of $\left(\# a^{\prime}\right)^{+}$. Letting $\left(a_{0}, a_{0}^{\prime}\right)=\left(a, a^{\prime}\right)$, we get a chain

$$
u<\left\{a_{0}, a_{0}^{\prime}\right\}<\left\{a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right\}<\ldots<\left\{a_{k}, a_{k}^{\prime}\right\}<v
$$

for some $k \geq 1$, where

- $a_{i} \sim a_{i}^{\prime}($ all $i \leq k)$,
- $\mathcal{M}\left(\# a_{i}\right)=\mathcal{M}\left(a_{i}^{\prime},\left(a_{i}^{\prime}\right)^{+}\right), \mathcal{M}\left(\# \# a_{i}\right)=\mathcal{M}\left(a_{i}, a_{i}^{+}\right)$(some $a_{i}^{+} \geq$ $\left.a_{i},\left(a_{i}^{\prime}\right)^{+} \geq a_{i}^{\prime}\right)$,
- $\operatorname{Suc}\left(\# a_{i}^{+}, \# a_{i+1}\right), S u c\left(\# a_{i}^{+}, \# a^{\prime}{ }_{i+1}\right), \operatorname{Suc}\left(\# a_{i}^{+}, \# a_{i+1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Suc}\left(\# a_{i}^{+}, \# a^{\prime}{ }_{i+1}\right)$ (for $\left.i<k\right)$, and
- $\operatorname{Suc}\left(u, a_{0}\right), \operatorname{Suc}\left(u, a_{0}^{\prime}\right), \operatorname{Suc}\left(\# a_{k}^{+}, v\right), \operatorname{Suc}\left(\# a_{k}^{\prime+}, v\right)$.

The two ways this can happen are illustrated in figure 6, for $k=2$.
We know that $a_{0} \models_{c} \mathbf{F} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{F} a_{1}^{\prime}$. If $a_{0}$ is irreflexive $a_{0} \models_{c}$ $\mathbf{G} \neg\left(\mathbf{F} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{F} a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$ so $a_{0} \models_{c} \uparrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. Since $a_{0}^{\prime} \sim a_{0}, a_{0}^{\prime} \models_{c} \mathbf{F} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{F} a_{1}^{\prime}$ we must have $a_{0}^{\prime} \models_{c} \mathbf{F} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{F} a_{1}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{G} \neg \uparrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. Since $a_{2} \models_{c}$
$\mathbf{P} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{P} a_{1}^{\prime}$ and $a_{2}^{\prime} \models_{c} \mathbf{P} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{P} a_{1}^{\prime}$ are successors of $a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}$, either $a_{2} \models_{c} \downarrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right), a_{2}^{\prime} \models_{c} \mathbf{P} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{P} a_{1}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \downarrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$, or $a_{2}^{\prime} \models_{c} \downarrow$ $\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right), a_{2} \models_{c} \mathbf{P} a_{1} \wedge \mathbf{P} a_{1}^{\prime} \wedge \mathbf{H} \neg \downarrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. Without loss (or by renaming) suppose $a_{2} \models_{c \downarrow} \downarrow\left(a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. By repeating this renaming, we have $a_{2 i} \models_{c} \downarrow\left(a_{2 i-1}, a_{2 i-1}^{\prime}\right) \wedge \uparrow\left(a_{2 i+1}, a_{2 i+1}^{\prime}\right)$ whenever $0<2 i<k$. A $p$-morphism for the case $k=2$ is illustrated on the left in figure6. A $p$-morphism $f$ may be constructed where $f(i, j)=a_{i+j}$ and points spatially between $(i, j)$ and $(i+1, j-1)$ use a $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)$, whenever $i+j$ is an even integer in $[0, k]$. Also when $i+j$ is even, the open segment $((i, j),(i+1, j))$ maps densely to $\left(\# a_{i+j+1}\right)^{+}$and the segment $((i, j),(i, j+1))$ maps densely to $\left(\# \# a_{i+j+1}\right)^{+}$. Points above all these nodes, edges and rectangles map densely to $v$ and points below map densely to $u$.


Figure 6: There is a chain $u<\left\{a_{0}, a_{0}^{\prime}\right\}<\left\{a_{1}, a_{1}^{\prime}\right\}<\ldots<\left\{a_{k}, a_{k}^{\prime}\right\}<v$, where $k \geq 1$ (here $k=2$ ) for $i \leq k$ we have $a_{i} \sim a_{i}^{\prime}$. On the left we have $\models_{c} \operatorname{Pt}\left(a_{i}\right)$ when $i \in[0, k]$ is even (four corners exist and are equal), but no other rectangle includes a corner, $a_{2 i} \models_{c} \uparrow\left(a_{2 i+1}, a_{2 i+1}^{\prime}\right)$ for $2 i \in[0, k-1]$ and $a_{2 i} \models_{c} \downarrow\left(a_{2 i-1}, a_{2 i-1}^{\prime}\right)$ for $2 i \in[1, k]$. On the right each rectangle includes its right corner only, illustrated in bold for $\mathcal{M}\left(\# a_{0}\right)$ and $\mathcal{M}\left(\# \# a_{0}\right)$, not indicated on other rectangles.

So finally suppose $u$ has exactly two successors, both clusters. A $p$-morphism for this case with $k=2$ is illustrated on the right of figure 6

For $x \sim y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$ recall that $x \vee y, x \wedge y$ denote the supremum and infimum of $\{x, y\}$. Let $x \sim y \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$. We write $[x, y]$ for the rectangle $\left\{z \in \mathbb{R}^{2}: x \wedge y \leq z \leq x \vee y\right\}$, define a rectangle $(x, y]$ by deleting both lightlines through $x$ from $[x, y]$, define rectangles $[x, y),(x, y)$ similarly. A $p$-morphism $f$ is constructed by using a $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)$ over $((i, j),(i+1, j-1)]$ mapping open edge segment $((i, j),(i+1, j))$ densely to $\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)$ and the segment $\left(\left(i_{1}, j\right),(i+1, j+1)\right)$ densely to $\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)^{+}$, when $i+j$ is even and $\leq k$, noting by axiom (XV) that we can label the rightmost corner $(i+1, j-1)$ by an MCS where $\left.\mathbf{G P}\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)^{+}\right) \wedge \mathbf{H F}\left(\# a_{i+j}\right)$ holds. Similarly, we use a $p$-morphism for $\mathcal{M}\left(\# \# a_{i+j}\right)$ when $i+j$ is odd $\leq k$, see the second part of figure 6. Points above and below all these rectangles map densely to $v, u$ respectively.

This completes the final case, where $u$ has exactly two successors. Thus, $\mathcal{M}(u, v)$ has a $p$-morphism, for all $u \leq v \in \mathcal{M}$. Now let $u=b, v=t$ the bottom and top clusters and we have a $p$-morphism $f: \mathbb{R}^{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$. We may assume that $\phi \in f(x)$ for some $x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}$, then $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2},<\right), x \models_{v} \phi$ under the valuation $v(p)=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{2}: p \in f(x)\right\}$. Thus, every consistent formula has a model, proving theorem 9

## Problems

- Eliminate any redundancies from axioms XV and simplify them.
- Find sound and complete axioms for the temporal logics of the following frames: $\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}, \leq\right), \quad\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}, \prec\right), \quad\left(\mathbb{R}^{2}, \preceq\right)$ where $\prec, \preceq$ denote slower than light accessibility.
- Find sound and complete axioms for the temporal logic of any higher dimensional frame, e.g. $\left(\mathbb{R}^{n},<\right)$ for $n \geq 3$.
- Is there are temporal formula that is valid in $\left(\mathbb{R}^{n},<\right)$ but not in $\left(\mathbb{R}^{n+1},<\right)$, for any $n \geq 3$ ?


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